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THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: COMPLEMENTARITY AS
A STRENGTH OR A WEAKNESS?
LINDA E. CARTER•
INTRODUCTION

The "complementarity" principle that shapes the relationship of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with national jurisdictions is both
criticized and applauded. The idea is that states have the primary
responsibility to investigate and prosecute the crimes 1 in the Rome
Statute/ with the ICC as a backup court. 3 The built-in deference, or
complementarity, of the ICC to national prosecutions respects state
sovereignty and places significant control within national jurisdictions. At
the same time, the ICC's secondary role arguably weakens the Court's
position as a means to achieve accountability for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.
This Essay examines the strengths and weaknesses of the
complementarity principle. The Essay then considers rcconceptualizing the
"success" of the ICC from an expectation of adjudicating cases to an
expectation of fostering national prosecutions. If the ICC 's role is viewed
through the lens of increasing the capacity of national jurisdictions to
adjudicate international crimes, the measures of the ICC 's success will
move from its own prosecutions to efforts to educate, assist, and facilitate
national prosecutions. The focus on assisting in the development of
national capacity is sometimes called "positive complementarity."4 This
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School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Leila Sadat and the Whitney R. Harris World Law
Institute at Washington University School of Law for the opportunity to present the ideas in this Essay
at a conference on "The International Criminal Court at Ten" on November 11-12, 2012. I would also
like to thank Rebecca Tatum White and Andrew Ducart of Pacific McGeorge for their excellent
research assistance. All opinions, and errors, are mine.
I. Throughout this Essay. the tenns "international crimes," " ICC crimes," and " Rome Statute
crimes" will be used interchangeably with the crimes of genocide. crimes against humanity, and war
crimes that arc in the Rome Statute.
2. The Rome Statute is the treaty that created the ICC.
3. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, TilE INTERNATIONA L CR IMI NAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE 50-53 (2010) (discussing development of complementarity concept); ROY S.
LEE, INTRODUC.TtON, ntE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TH E MAKING OF Ti l e ROME
STATUTE 27- 28 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (discussing the role of complementarity in the drafting of the
Rome Statute).
4. Report of the Bureau o n Stocktaking: Complementarity to the 8 th Session of the Assembly of
States Parties (ASP), Mar. 22-25,20 10, Doc. ICC-ASP/8/51 , 16 (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Bureau
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emphasis, in tum, should suggest a different strategy for the ICC in
developing national capacities. Recommendations for how the ICC can
increase its role in developing national capacities arc proposed, including
the establishment of an Institute or Center. While complementarity could
prove to be either a strength or a weakness, the Essay concludes that, with
a revised definition of success and a stronger focus on capacity building,
complementarity likely will prove to be a strength of the ICC as an
institution.

I. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE ROME STATUTE
The Preamble to the Rome Statute, the treaty through which the ICC
was established,5 expressly recognizes the importance of complementarity:
the International Criminal Court established under this Statute
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions ... 6
The idea that the ICC will be secondary to prosecutions in national
jurisdictions is strikingly different from the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council for adjudicating
cases from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are based on a principle of
"primacy." Those tribunals can preempt a prosecution in a national
jurisdiction if the tribunal decides to proceed. 7 The Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL), a tribunal established by agreement between the
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, similarly operates
under a primacy principle. 8 Part of the reasoning behind adopting a

Report to ASP 8] ("[P)ositivc complementarity refers to all activities/actions whereby national
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of
crimes included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in capacity building, financial
support and technical assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist
each other on a voluntary basis."); ICC Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 2012, ~ 16- 17 (Feb. I, 20 I0),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229DII28F65/281
506/0TPProsecutoriaiStrategy200920 13.pdf (defining "positive complementarity" as "a proactive
policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings"); see also William W. Burke-White,
Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome
System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 n.4 (2008) (suggesting that "proactive" is a
more accurate term than "positive" complementarity).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter "Rome Statute"], available at http://icc-cpi.int/en_ menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20
tools/official%20joumal/Pages/romc%20statute.aspx.
6. /d.
7. ICTY Statute art. 9; ICTR Statute art. 8.
8. SCSL Statute art. 8.
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complementarity approach with the ICC was to balance a concern for state
sovereignty with the creation of an international authority by giving states
the first option to prosecute cases. 9 The effect of complementarity should
be to encourage national prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. 10
In addition to the general language in the Preamble, Article 17 of the
Rome Statute in particular implements the principle of complementarity.
Article 17 sets out the admissibility standards for cases before the Court.
Cases are not admissible in the ICC if a state with jurisdiction (1) is
investigating or prosecuting the case, 11 (2) has investigated and decided
not to prosecute, 12 or (3) has already tried the individual for the conduct
and the retrial would be barred under the ne bis in idem provisions of the
statute.13 A case is also inadmissible for a fourth reason if it is not of
"sufficient gravity." 14 The first three reasons to reject admissibility of a
case in the ICC directly reflect deference to national prosecutions. The
only exception 15 occurs when a state with jurisdiction is "unwilling or

9. See JA NN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL
CR IMINAL JURISDICTIONS 95- 97 (2008) (hereinafter KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY] (describing
the importance of state sovereignty in the negotiations over the complementarity provisions); John T.
Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in TH E INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TilE
MAKING OF TilE ROME STATUTE 41,74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (describing the importance of the
complementarity structure to the balance with sovereignty and support for the treaty); Michael A.
Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are we Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 115, 120 23 (2010) (commenting on the relationship between the sovereignty of
states and the role of complementarity in obtaining states' agreement to the ICC); Leila Nadya Sadat &
S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Re•·olution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381,
415 (2000) (noting that the treaty wou ld likely have been unacceptable to many states if the ICC had
been given greater jurisdiction; also commenting on the negative effect of complementarity on
cooperation with the Court).
10. See KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 9, at 309 12 (describing the role of
complementarity as a catalyst for states for states to improve their judicial systems and to adjudicate
cases of international crimes); Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complememarity, 53
HARV. INT'L L.J. 85. 126--27 (2012) (noting that states are more likely to ratify the Rome Treaty if
they believe they can preempt the Court through national prosecutions and suggesting that a sentencebased approach to detennining the willingness and ability of a state to handle a case would maximize
state support for the ICC because the prosecutions could be for ordinary crimes with sentences
comparable to ICC-imposed sentences); Newton, supra note 9, at 146--47 (commenting on the need for
states to implement ICC crimes domestically in order to meet the requirement of state investigation
and prosecution); Jann K. KJeffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of
Substantive lntemalional Criminal Law, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 86, 88 89 (2003) (discussing
complementarity as an incentive for states to enact international crimes into domestic law).
II. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17( I )(a).
12. /d. art. 17( I )(b).
13. /d. arts. 17(1)(c), 20.
14. /d. art. 17(1)(d).
15. Although the language of "unwilling or unable" is not in article 17 (c) on prior prosecution,
article 20, which specifically addresses ne bis in idem also excepts situations in whic h a trial was for
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unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution" 16 or "the
decision [not to prosecute] resulted from the unwillingness or inability of
the State genuinely to prosecute." 17 Unwillingness occurs when a state is
shielding a person from criminal responsibility or is conducting
proceedings "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice." 18 Inability arises when a national system is so impacted that it
cannot proceed with obtaining evidence or trying the individual. 19
It is clear from the Preamble and the purpose of Article 17 that national
jurisdictions can preempt the ICC from going forward with a case by
conducting a good faith investigation and a subsequent prosecution or
decision not to prosecute on the national level. Complementarity is a
powerful device for national jurisdictions to maintain control of criminal
matters and to limit the reach of the ICC. The principle is also strong
motivation for national jurisdictions to prosecute international crimes,
which in tum is important to an overall goal of the ICC to end impunity
for atrocities. Given the significant control by states, is complementarity a
weakness or a strength of the ICC as an institution? The next part
considers why complementarity might be a weakness and is followed by a
part that considers why it might be a strength.

the purpose of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility or was conducted in a way
inconsistent with bringing the individual to justice.
16. Rome Stanlte, supra note 5, an. 17(1)(a).
17. ld art. 17(l)(b).
18. /d. art. 17(2)(a}-(c). The provisions state:
2. In order to detenninc unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more
of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or arc being undertaken or the national decision was made for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
19. I d. art. 17(3). The provision states:
3. In order to detennine inabi lity in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to
a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to
carry out its proceedings.
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II. COMPLEMENTARITY AS A W EAKNESS
There are at least two primary concems with complementarity. One is
inherent in the structure of the ICC, and the other is in the implementation
of the statutory mandate.

A. Inherent Problem
An inherent problem exists because with complementarity the Court is
secondary to national jurisdictions, and in that sense is weaker than other
international criminal courts such as the ICTY and ICTR, which have
primacy over national jurisdictions. One effect of this inherent weakness is
that the Court wields less authority over the states; the states have the
option of maintaining the upper hand vi s a vis the Court. It is within the
power of the states to go forward with investigations and prosecutions,
preempting the Court. If the ICC's Prosecutor wants to advance a case,
there may be legal hurdles in the way. This is already happening with
admissibility challenges to the Court's jurisdiction by Kenya and Libya. 20
These specific challenges arc discussed below as an implementation issue.
The inherent structure of the relationship of the Court and states may
be a weakness for another reason. The effect of the secondary status of the
ICC is that the Court will, and, in fact, should try fewer cases than the
other intcmational criminal courts . This is a success for the ICC if it
means national jurisdictions are trying international crimes, but it is also
qua litatively different from the ICTY and lCTR, which focus on both the
number of cases tried as well as the fairness ofthe procecdings. 2 t The ICC
is not going to be comparable in numbers of cases and this could be
viewed as a weakness. However, if we shift the conversation from "no
cases" to affirmative efforts to build national capacity, then we could
measure the ICC as an institution based not only on its adjudications, but
also on its success with establishing national capacity. This redefinition to
include capacity building as a measure of success would partially alleviate
the inherent weakness of complementarity.

20 . See infra notes 23- 28 and accompanying text.
2 1. See. e.g., Judge Khalida Rachid Khan. President of the ICTR, Address to the United Nations
Security Council (June 6, 20 II), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/.ictr.un.org/tabid/155/Defilllll.aspx
?id- 12 11 (referring to the importance of fair trials in the ICTR); ICTY, About the ICTY,
http://www.icty.org/sections/Aboullhe iCTY (last visited Dec. 18, 20 12) (noting the number of cases
and that the ICTY "regards its fairness and impartiality to be of paramount importance'' ).
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B. Implementation Problem

In addition to an inherent issue, there is also an implementation
concern that complementarity at least indirectly creates a tension between
the Court and national jurisdictions. This occurs due to admissibility
challenges and also to the perception that the ICC is focused on weaker
nations.
In an admissibility challenge, a state will often be pitting itself against
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in raising the issue whether the ICC or
the state should investigate or prosecute. Litigation always raises tensions,
but that pressure is heightened when there is also a political dynamic
involved. Although a party can bring admissibility challenges, Article
19(2)(b)-(ci2 provides an avenue for a state to bring the challenge, which
adds a political dimension.
To date, two states have challenged the admissibility of cases in the
ICC. 23 Kenya challenged the prosecution of two cases, involving six highlevel government officials and opposition. Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected
Kenya's challenge24 and the Appeals Chamber affirrned. 25 Legal

22. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 19.
23. In a third case, the accused himself challenged admissibi lity. See Prosecutor v. Katanga &
Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-0 1/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Genna in Katanga Against the
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case (Sept. 25, 2009)
(af!irn1ing the Trial Chamber in its decision against Katanga's admissibility challenge, having found a
"clear and explicit expression of unwillingness of the DRC to prosecute this case.").
24. There arc two cases involving Kenya. Both decisions are substantially the same. Prosecutor
v. Muthuara et al., Case No. ICC-01 /09-02/ 11, Decision on the Application by the Government of
Kenya Challenging the Admissibi lity of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30,
20 ll) (finding that, at the point where the matter is a "case,'' the state's focus must be on the "same
person" as well as the ''same conduct" to successfully mount an admissibility challenge; rejecting
proffer of subsequent reports by Kenya to establish appropriate investigation because assessment must
be at the time of the admissibility challenge); see also Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-0 l /0901/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011).
25. Prosecutor v. Muthuara ct al., Case No. ICC-01 /09-02/ 11, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled 'Decision on
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute' (Aug. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Muthuara Appeals Decision] (a ffirming
test of "same person" and "substantially same conduct" and the Pre-Trial Chamber's holding that the
case was admissible against Kenya's challenge; finding no abuse of discretion in rejecting Kenya's
request for more time and to hold an oral hearing). 11te second Kenya case was resolved in the same
manner. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01 /09-01 / 11 , Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic
of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled 'Decision on the
Application by the Government of Kenya C hallenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute' (Aug. 30, 2011 ). In both cases, Judge Usacka dissented. Prosecutor v.
Muthuara et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka (Sept. 20,
20 11 ); Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-01 /09-01/ ll , Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita
USllcka (Sept. 20, 20 11 ) (emphasizing the importance of complementarity in the Rome Statute; finding
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commentators are debating the merits of the analysis by the Court and
whether this was a proper interpretation of the statute in light of the
purpose of complementarity. 26 In the second case, Libya has challenged
the admissibility of cases involving two members of Moammar Gaddafi's
inner circle. Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the admissibility challenge with
regard to one accused, retaining the case in the ICC; the Chamber found
the case inadmissible, however, with regard to the second accused, which
leaves jurisdiction with Libya to try the case. 27 These issues, too, are much
debated in commentary and in the press. 28
[n part because these arc issues of first impression in interpreting the
statute, they are creating much attention. Embedded in the focus on
admissibility, however, is the question of who will prevail- the ICC or the
state? This was never an issue with the ICTY or ICTR. There is the
potential for the ICC to lose credibility if states believe that decisions
against them on admissibility are incorrect. Nevertheless, admissibility
challenges are regulated through the statutory scheme. Although thi s is
one part of the tension, there is a principled legal process for resolving
those issues. Although individual states may take issue with the Court 's
ruling in a specific case, once the legal analysis is more settlcd,29 this
should reduce the current weakness in this aspect of complementarity.

that assessment of complementarity should be an ongoing process; finding that the Pre-Trial Chamber
abused its discretion in failing to recognize the discretion in procedures that would have allowed for
additional submissions and in overemphasizing expediency in the proceedings).
26. See, e.g., Charles Chcmor Jalloh, International Decision: Situation in the Republic of Kenya:
No. ICC-OI/ 09-02111-274 Judgment on Kenya's Appeal of Decision Denying Admissibility, 106 AM.
J. INT'L L. 118, 122 25 (20 12) (discussing the strict usc and appl ication of a "same personsubstantially same conduct" tes t as potentially undermining national efforts to prosecute and
suggesting that one alternative would have been to suspend or defer prosecution pending further action
by Kenya).
27. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01 / 11 -01 /1 1, Decision on the
admissibility of the case against Saif AI- Islam Gaddafi (May 31, 20 13); Decision on the admissibility
of the case against Abdullah AI-Senussi (Oct. I I, 2013).
28. Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of the International
Criminal Court Through Its lnvolvemem in Libya, 80 FORDIIAM L.R. 2267 (2012) (arguing that the
ICC should cooperate with Libya to try Saif Al- lslam Gaddafi in Libya); Eric Leonard, Testing the
ICC: 1l1e Politics of Complementarity, JURIST (June I, 2012. I :06 PM ), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/
061eric-leonard-libya-ICC.php (postulating that the real issue in the Libya admissibility challenge is
whether Libya is able to hold a fair trial, but suggesting nonetheless that the trials s hould be held in
Libya because "the court should always privilege the principle of complementarity").
29. While the Appeals Chamber affinned the use of a "same person, same conduct" test for
detem1ining admissibility, that test is s till new and is dependent upon the stage of the proceedings; in
the Kenya cases, the Appeals Chamber noted that this standard is for "cases" that arc past the
investigation phase. Muthuara Appeals Decision, supra note 25, ,1,1 34, 41. Given the novelty of
assessing admissibility, it is likely that the Court will refine the interpretation of the standards.
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More difficult to address than the legal issue of admissibility is a
tension between the ICC and states that arises from the perception that the
Court is focusing on weaker nations and, specifically, on African
countries. 30 This tension is an indirect effect of complementarity, but it
nevertheless poses a potential weakness stemming from the principle. The
OTP and the Court undoubtedly make decisions that have no direct
connection to whether a state is strong or weak, but the reality is that
nations with highly developed legal systems are likely to investigate and
prosecute on their own, exercising the complementarity provisions. We are
not likely to see self-referrals from developed countries as has occurred
with three African nations. 31 At this point in time, this tension and
perception may be somewhat inevitable as an indirect result of
complementarity, but should dissipate as national capacity to try
international crimes becomes more widely spread throughout Africa and
other parts of the world. Thus, complementarity is a potential weakness
because, indirectly, it may lead to a perception of inequality before the
ICC if national capacity remains weak. As discussed further below, this
potential weakness could be decreased by greater emphasis on the ICC as
a capacity-building institution and greater realization of national capacity.
III. COMPLEMENTAR!TY AS

A

STRENGTH

There is tremendous potential for complementarity to be a strength of
the ICC as an institution . First, it is worth noting that states give up less
sovereignty with complementarity than they would in a system based on
primacy of an international criminal court. 32 With more control left in the
hands of states, there is likely to be greater support for the Court and states
arc likely to be more willing to be parties to the treaty. 33 Despite the
recalcitrance of several major nations, such as the United States, Russia,
China, and India, to become states parties, the impressive number of 122

30. Charles Chemor Jalloh, Africa and Jhe fnlemalional Criminal Cow·/: Collision Course or
Cooperalion?, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 203,209-11 (2012) (noting the criticism and perception of the
ICC as focusing on weaker nations and especially those from Africa, but contesting the accuracy of the
sweeping statements); William A. Schabas, Viclor 's Juslice: Selecling "SiJuaJions" a/ I he
fnlemalional Criminal Courl, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535,549 (2010) (raising the question of a
political aspect to the decisions to prosecute); Jeremy Sarkin, Enhancing /he Legilimacy, Stalus, and
Role of Jhe inlernalional Criminal CourJ Globally by Using Transilional Jus/ice and ResJoraJive
Jus/ice Slralegies, 6 INTERDISC. J. H UM. Rrs. L. 83- 84 (20 12) (noting the perception that the ICC is
focusing only on Africa).
31. ICC, The Coun Today, Doc. ICC-PIDS-TCT-OI-018/ 12_Eng (Nov. 30, 2012) (Uganda, the
Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
32. See supra note 9.
33. See supra note 10.
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member states34 is evidence of the acceptance and support for the Court.
The greater the number of states parties, the more legitimacy the ICC will
have, which, in tum, allows the Court to contribute more to accountability
for international crimes globally.
Secondly, complementarity will prove to be a strength if it leads to
increased national capacity to adjudicate international crimes. Because
complementarity gives the first option to states to prosecute, states have a
strong motivation to develop their national capacities to try war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. 35 State capacity provides those
states with the option to preempt the ICC from hearing a case.
Moreover, national capacity promotes accountabi lity. Even without the
complementarity regime, it is not possible to try all international crimes in
an international court. An increase in the number of national prosecutions
would include larger numbers of cases and also include lower level
perpetrators, who are not prosecuted at the internationallcvel. 36 The ICTY,
ICTR, SCSL, ECCC, and the ICC are purposely designed to try those who
are the most responsible for serious crimes. 37 While the number of
prosecutions in the ICTY ( 161 indictments) is imprcssive/8 this is still

34. ICC, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://icc-cpi.int/en menus/asp/states%20
parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Oct. 22,
2013).
35. For example, Uganda has passed laws incorporating the Rome Statute Crimes and created an
International Crimes Division in their High Court. See Alhagi Marong, Unlocking the Mysteriousness

of complementarity: In Search of a Forum Conveniens for Trial of the Leaders of the Lord's
Resistance Army, 40 GA. J. INT' L & COMP. L. 67, 83 84 (2011).
36. The importance of the role of states in prosecuting international crime is also recognized in
the efforts to promulgate a treaty on crimes against humanity. See George H. Stanton, Why the World
Needs an International Convention on Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 354, 356 57 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 201 1) (describing the limitations
of the ICC to prosecute international crimes and the need for domestic laws to effectively punish
widespread crimes against humanity).
37. SCSL Statute art. I ("The Special Court sha ll. except as provided in subparagraph (2), have
the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibi lity for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Lconean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since 30 November 1996 .... "); ECCC Statute art. 6 ("the scope of the prosecution is limited to senior
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and cus tom, and international
conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6
January 1979.''); ICTR Statute art. I ("The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for s uch violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States between I January 1994 and 31 December 1994 ... ."); ICTY Statute art. I ("The
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the forn1er Yugoslavia since 1991 ....");
Rome Statute. supra note 5, art. I (')urisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern'').
38. ICTY, Key Figures of Cases, http:l/www.icty.org/sid/24 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
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only a portion of those who could be held responsible. Similarly, the
historical antecedent of Nuremberg only focused on 24 major leaders in
the Nazi regime. 39 This is not intended as a criticism of the international
criminal tribunals; instead, it is meant to emphasize the importance of
parallel national prosecutions. If the ICC's complementarity regime
contributes to the development of national capacity to try genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, it should be viewed as a strength of
the system.
In fact, national prosecutions for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide are occurring. It is not possible to determine to what extent
the ICC has had an effect on the development of national capacity,40 and
the ICC is still at a young stage. However, it is informational to note that
national jurisdictions are already engaged in prosecutions of international
crimes. Although the number of cases may not seem extensive at this point
in time, we can expect the numbers to rise as states parties enact national
legislation on the crimes in the Rome Statute and develop their own
expertise to try the cases. The Coalition for the International Criminal
Court reports that 59 states parties presently have legislation implementing
the crimes and 38 have legislation in the works.41 As the number of states
parties with domestic legislation increases due to implementing the Rome
Statute crimes for complementarity purposes, the influence of the ICC will
be more direct.
An exact figure for the number of prosecutions for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity is elusive because up-to-date and

39. See BETII VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS ENFORCEMENT 30 31 (2d ed. 2010) (24 were indicted; 2 were not tried due to illness and suicide;
I was tried in absentia; 21 tried at Nuremberg, with 18 convictions and 3 acquittals).
40. In some specific instances, it may be possible to document the impact of the ICC on
furthering natio nal prosecutions. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 4, at 105-07 (noting that
prosecutions in the DRC were in response to the OTP's announcement of investigating the situation in
that country).
4 1. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CHART ON TilE STATUS OF
RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME STATUTE AND TilE AGREEMENT ON PRJVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES (A PIC) 3- 39 (20 12), available at http:l/www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/
Global Ratificationimplementation_chart_May2012.pdf. These are the numbers on enacting the
crim es into national legis lation. The C ICC also reports that 65 states have either the crimes or the
cooperation provisions, or both enacted, and that 35 states have legislation on one or the other in the
process of enactment. Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE ICC, http:l/www
.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=rome implementation (last visited Feb. 16, 20 13). Note, loo, that states
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Ja n. 12, 195 I ,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, have an obligation to pass domestic legislation to punish genocide; as a res ull, many
states have domestic legislation on the crime of genocide. See WILLIAM A. SCIIABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW : THE CRIME OF CR IMES 400- 01 ,435 43 (2d ed. 2009) (for a comprehensive
discussion of the obligation and of domestic prosecutions for genocide).

2013)

TI IE FUTURE OF THE ICC

461

comprehensive databases do not exist. 42 Our research so far has yielded
43
the following data for prosecutions from 2002 to the present time:
20 prosecutions for genocide
46 prosecutions for war crimes and
67 prosecutions for crimes against humanity
The distribution of the prosecutions around the world and the variety of
conflicts from which they arise is also of interest. 44 Many of the national
prosecutions relate to the former Yugoslavia and to Rwanda. However,
others relate to Guatemala, Argentina, iraq, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. 45 Moreover, some prosecutions are occurring in the
countries in which the crimes occurred while others are taking place
through universal jurisdiction in countries without a direct connection to
the crimes other than having the accused in custody. For example,
prosecutions have occurred or are occurring in Canada, Norway, France,
Germany, Spain, and Belgium for crimes that occurred during the
Rwandan genocide. 46
In addition to the numbers of prosecutions, the structures within
national jurisdictions are becoming more sophisticated. For example,

42. Moreover, there arc prosecutions for murder, maltreatment of prisoners, and other crimes that
could be labeled as crimes against humanity or war crimes that arc not; instead they are prosecuted
under a more ordinary crime label. Nevertheless, they do represent national efforts to prosecute
atrocities. For example, although they probably could have been prosecuted for war crimes. the U.S.
soldiers who abused Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib were prosecuted for assault, maltreatment of
prisoners, and dereliction of duty. See. e.g., United States v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104, 105 (C.A.A.F. 2010)
(convicted of convicted of maltreatment of persons subject to his orders, conspiracy, assault, indecent
acts and dereliction of duty). One can criticize the prosecutions for the ordinary crimes as insufficient
or as not going far enough up the ladder of officials, but at least this is a form of accountability.
43. Lists of sources and individual cases are on file with author and the Washington Universily
Global Studies Law Revi,•w [hereinafter " List"].
44. These numbers include completed prosecutions, whether convictions, acquittals, or
dismissals for other reasons, and pending prosecutions. List, supra note 43. There are additional cases
that arc referenced in other sources. See. e.g., Burke-White, supra note 4 , at 106 (referring to 48
prosecutions for crimes against humanity and 2 for war crimes in the DRC). If one also counts all
convictions in the Rwandan Gacaca courts as genocide convictions, there would be almost 2 million
more genocide cases. See Gacaca Closes Shop, NAT'L COMM'N FOR TilE FIGIIT AGAINST GENOCIDE
(June 19, 20 12), http:/lcnlg.gov.rw/ncws/ 12/06/ 19/gacaca-closes-shop. The Gacaca proceedings were
not included in our calculations here because they are an alternative to a regular judicial proceeding;
only cases that were before national courts were counted.
45. See supra note 43.
46. It is also worth noting that some of the national prosecutions are occurring due to referrals by
international criminal courts. The ICTR has referred two to France and two to Rwanda; the ICTY has
referred 6 cases to Bosnia and 2 to Croatia. Transfer of'Cases. lCTY, http://www.icty.org/sectionsllbe
Cases/TransferofCases (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); Status of Cases, ICTR, http://www.unietr.org/
Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 20 12).
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Uganda has an International Crimes Division ("ICD") in their High
47
Court with three highly trained and qualified judges in place. The
specialized division promotes significant national expertise.
Some of the motivation for these developments, such as the lCD in
Uganda, can be attributed, at least in part, to the complementarity
regime. 48 In general, the important point is that, given the large number of
states parties to the Rome Treaty, complementarity is going to contribute
to greater awareness and interest in prosecuting international crimes in the
future. If the ICC's accomplishments are measured at least in part by the
increase in national prosecutions due to the complementarity regime,
complementarity could prove to be a great strength of the ICC.
IV. MAXIMIZING COMPLEMENTARITY AS A STRENGTH FOR THE ICC

Two developments would advance complementarity as a strength of
the Court. The first is to reconceptualizc what is meant by "success" of the
ICC, and the second is to implement an even greater leadership role for the
ICC in positive complementarity efforts than is already occurring.

A. Reconceptualizing "Success"
Generally, evaluation measures for a court will be in terms of the
number and types of cases tried and the fairness of the proceedings. 49 This
is true for national courts and international ones. 50 On the international

47. There is also greater flexibility in national jurisdictions-e.g., in Uganda. the International
Crimes Division has jurisdiction over other transnational crimes- "genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and any other international crime (as provided for in
other statutes]." See International Crimes Div. , REP. OF UGANDA : THE JUDICIARY, http://www
.judicature.go.ug/data/smenu/18/lnternational_ C rimes_ Division.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). This,
too, is an important aspect of national capacity building. There is more flexibility in national
jurisdictions than in international tribunals to expand the types of crimes over which they exercise
authority.
48. See Marong, supra note 35, at 73- 74, 78-87 (describing Uganda's adoption of an
International Crimes Act with the goal of trying serious international crimes domestically).
49. See James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 621 - 24 (2004) (positing several measures of success for international
tribunals including expeditiousness of proceedings, fairness, transparency, historical documentation,
inc lusion of victims, reconciliation, increasing respect for the rule of law, and strengthening the
judicial system); see also the discussion of requirement of fair standards in the context of transfers to
Rwanda from the ICTR. Marong, supra note 35, at 95-96.
50. For example, other international criminal courts have been critic ized for either a lack of
impartiality/ victor's justice or the small number of cases. See, e.g., regarding the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC): Seeta Scully, Judging the Successes and Failures of the
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts ofCambodia, 13 ASIAN- PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 300,325- 34
(2011) (lack of impartiality); Padraic J. Glaspy, Justice Delayed? Recent Developments at the
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level, for instance, the IC TY takes pride in the number of cases tried and
the significance of the accused that have been brought to justice. Reports
51
52
a nd information on the ICTY 's wcbsite
to the United Nations
emphasize the numbers and the high-level accused as evidence of the
accomplishments of the tribunal. The ICTY a lso prides itself on
conducting proceedings m accord with international due process
. . Ics.53
pnnc1p
As a court, the ICC must have credibility, leg itimacy, and impartiality
in its judicial operations in order to be a "success ." Its rol e as a court is
important in how it tries cases and in ensuring accountability for serio us
international crimes. It is certainly va lid to evaluate the Court on this
basis . The nature of the proceedings, and e ven the number of ca ses, is
highly visible, publicized, and analyzed. The w ebsite is devoted to the
54
investigations and cases and well doc umented . Thus, the objective of
demonstrating fair and impartial proceed ings is well documented.

Extraordinwy Chambers in rhe Courts of Cambodia, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 143, I 53 54 (2008) (lack
of impartiality); Leah Chavla, Somheasr Asia and Oceana: Cambodia 's Human Righrs Progress and
National Reconciliaraty Efforts in Jeopardy, I 8.2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 30, 40 (Winter 201 I) (small
number of individuals on trial). Regarding the International C riminal Tribunal lor Rwanda (ICTR), see
Lars Waldorf: "A Mere Prelense of Jus/ice": Complementarily, Sham Trials, and Victor's Justice a/
the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1221, 1271-76 (2010) (criticizing the prosecution of
only one side of the conflict); Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the fnternalional
Criminal 71-ibunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 49,
70 78 (20 I I) (contrasting the ICTY and SCS L which prosecuted all sides of the conflict with the
IC TR prosecuting only one side). Regarding the Special Court. for Sierra Leone (SCSL): Charles
Chemor Jalloh. Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MtCII. J. INT'L L. 395, 418 22
(2011) (describing criticisms of the small number of prosecutions); Donna E. Arzt, Views on the
Ground: The Local Perceprion of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and
Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM . ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226, 233 (2006) (commenting on mixed
views in Sierra Leone about the small number o f prosecutions).
51. Report of the International Tribunal for the Forn1er Yugoslavia, Doc. N67/214--S/2012/592,
2, 67 68 (Aug. I, 20 12), ai'Gilable al http://www.icty.org/x/fi le/About/Reports%20and%20
Publicationsl/\nnua1Reports/annual_ report_2012_en.pdf; Report of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Doc. N66/2 10- S/20 11/473, ,MI 54- 57 (July 3 I, 20 11 ), available a/ http://www
.icty.org/x/file/ /\bout/Reports%20and%20 Publications/AnnualReports/annual report 20 II cn.pdf.
52. ICTY, Key Figures, http://www.icty.org/sectionsffheCases/KcyFigures (last visited Dec. 12,
2012); ICTY, Timeline, http://www.icty.org/action/timelinc/254 (last visited Dec. 20, 20 12); ICTY,
Aboul !he ICTY, http://www.icty.org/seet ions/AbouttheiCTY (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (noting the
numbers indicated and that the accused have been "heads o f state, prime ministers, anny chiefs-ofs taff, interior ministers and many other high- and mid-level political, military and police leaders'').
53. ICTY, About !he ICTY, supra note 52.
54. News and Highlighrs, ICC, http://icc-cpi.int/EN Menus/iec/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 16, 20 13). The website links to updates on the situations currently under investigation at the
Court, as well as all the documents relevant to each prosecution, categorized by which organ of the
Court produced each. The website also provides extensive information regarding the Court's activities,
including briefings from the OTP, public statements from various organs. press releases, and
documentation such as policy papers and findings of various working groups. Additionally, the

464

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

(VOL.

12:451

Although the value and importance of the judicial proceedings should
not be understated, it is also important in the case of the lCC to develop a
measure for its role in complementarity. One often hears that the ICC
would be a success if it had no cases at all. 55 This might be true for any
court, but it is especially true for the ICC because of the principle of
complementarity. No cases in the ICC should mean that national
jurisdictions are trying cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. The problem with defining success in terms of no cases is that it
is difficult for people to credit a negative or a void, even if theoretically
one accepts the idea.
If we accept that the success of the ICC is dependent upon the two
major prongs of (1) fair and impartial operation of judicial proceedings
when they are needed, and (2) the increasing ability of national
jurisdictions to prosecute international crimes, then we should look at
tangible measures of both prongs. Additionally, the ICC and the
international community need to build the paradigm of "success" as
comprising both prongs. As mentioned above, the judicial proceedings arc
well documented, and it is clear that they are a major focus of how the
ICC is viewing its accomplishments. It will also be important for the ICC
to have substantive content and visibility in its efforts to build national
capacity so that this, too, is viewed as a major accomplishment of the
Court. The resolutions of the Assembly of States Parties ("ASP")56 and the
reports to the ASP from the Bureau of the Assembly (an executive
committee of the ASP) 57 and the Court58 emphasize the importance of
national capacity building and those documents describe various activities
by the Court to foster these efforts. However, the various efforts by the
Court to assist national jurisdictions do not get equal time on the website
or in the literature on the accomplishments of the Court. In part, this is due

website provides infom1ation about the history and structure of the Court as well as legal texts and
legal tools. Finally, the website contains the activities and documentation of the ASP.
55. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 54 (stating that Court could be viewed as a failure because
of false expectations regarding the number of cases); Jalloh, supra note 30, at 218 n.60 (citing to
statement by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-O'Campo that a high number of cases in the ICC would not
measure Court's efficiency).
56. Resolutions and Declarations Adopted by the Review Conference, Res. RC/Res.l (June 8,
2010); Resolutions Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-ASP/ l0/Res.5, ,MI 58-63 (Dec. 21, 2011);
Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-ASP/ Il/Res.6 (Nov. 21, 20 12).
57. Report of the Bureau on Complementarity to the II th Session of the ASP, Nov. 14-22, 2012,
Doc. ICC-ASP/ 11/24 (Nov. 7, 20 12) (hereinafter Bureau Report to ASP II], available at http://www
icc-cpi. int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP I 1/ ICC-ASP-1 1-24-ENG.pdf.
58. Report on the Activities of the Court to the lith Session of the ASP, Nov. 14- 22, 2012, Doc.
ICC-AS P/ 11/21 (Oct. 9. 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASPI 1/ICC-ASP
-11-21-ENG.pdf.
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to the recency of the efforts and, in part, this is due to the lesser role that
the positive complementary efforts play. To give full effect to the
complementarity role, it is imperative that the efforts on national capacity
building be recognized and developed further so that they do have an equal
role. A number of prominent non-governmental organizations have
similarly called for extensive work on national capacity building.59 The
next part develops ideas on how the ICC as an institution might accentuate
its positive complementary work. An increased focus on "success" as
measured by assistance in national capacity building would partially
diminish the first potential weakness from complementarity. In other
words, the inherent secondary status of the Court would be redefined as a
strength from the correlative increase in national prosecutions of
international crimes.

B. Increased Leadership Role in Building National Capacity
If the ICC as an institution is measured not only by the cases it tries,
but also by its efforts in national capacity building, then it is worthwhile to
examine what the ICC is doing now and to explore what actions the
institution might consider to increase its efforts. The ASP, the OTP, and
the Court itself are all fostering positive complementarity through various
efforts. In this part, it is suggested that the ICC could expand these efforts
and gain greater recognition for them through creation of an Institute or
Center within the institutional structure or in collaboration with an outside
organization.
Without question, there is an increased emphasis on what the Court can
do to assist efforts to build national capacity to investigate and prosecute
cases. Resolutions from the Kampala Review Conference, subsequent
reports by the Secretariat and the Court, and a resolution from the most
recent ASP meeting, the II th Session in November 2012, indicate the
importance of positive complementarity.
The significance given to building national capacity at the Kampala
Review Conference in 20 I0 is especially evident because there were so

59. Open Soc'y Justice Initiative. Building on the Complementarity Consensus: Background for
the ICC Assembly of States Parties, at 4 (Briefin g Paper Oct. 201 2), hllp://www.opcnsociety
foundations.org/sites/default/files/complementarity-asp- 10 152012.pdf [hereinafter OSJI Background
Paper]; lntemational Center for Transitional Justice, Stocktaking: Complementarity, Report to the
Rome Statute Review Conference, June 20 I 0 (May 201 0), h!tp://ictj.org/sitesldefault/files/ICTJRS RC-Giobai-Complementarity- Briefing-2010-English.pdf lhereinafter ICTJ Stocktaking]; see also
Burke-White, supra note 4. at 68 (suggesting a need for a formal policy of proactive complementarity
in the Office of the Prosecutor).
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many major issues that were on the table to be discussed. 60 The fact that
domestic competence to try international crimes was the subject of
discussion indicates its importance to the ASP. For example, the Report of
the Bureau on Stocktaking stated that complementarity referred to the need
to focus on complementarity "as it is imperative to further the fight against
impunity both at the international and at the national level .... "61 A
resolution emerging from the Review Conference recognized the necessity
of national capability and specified some actions that should be taken. The
resolution "[ e ]ncourages the Court [and others] to explore ways in which
to enhance the capacity of national jurisdiction ... " 62 and "[r]equests the
Secretariat ... to facilitate the exchange of information between the Court,
States Parties and other stakeholders ... aimed at strengthening domestic
jurisdictions ...." 63
The most recent statement by the 11th session of the ASP in November
2012 echoes the commitment to national capacity building. The ASP
resolved "[t]o enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to prosecute
the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern in
accordance with internationally recognized fair trial standards, pursuant to
the principle of complementarity."64
In preparation for the lith session of the ASP, the Bureau, the
Secretariat, and the Court prepared reports on their activities. Among its
activities, the Secretariat noted that it has connected various actors, who
can assist with knowledge and skills, with interested States 65 consulted
with organs of the Court how they might exchange information, such as
for a judicial training project,66 and created the Complementarity Extranet,
which is designed to bring together those with expertise with States that
need assistance. 67 The Bureau's report summarized the work of the

60. The issues raised at the Kampala Review Conference included defining the crime of
aggression, expanding the definition of war crimes, strengthen ing the en forcement of sentences, and
working toward greater justice for victims of international crimes. Resolutions and Declarations
Adopted by the Review Conference, Doc. RC/ 11 (June 8- 11, 2010).
61. Bureau Report to ASP 8, supra note 4,, 3.
62. Resolutions and Declarations Adopted by the Review Conference, Res. RCIRes.l, , 8 (June
8, 2010).
63. !d.~ 9.
64. Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the ASP, Res. ICC-AS P/ 111Res.6, 'Ill (Nov.
2 1, 2012).
65. Report of the Secretariat on Complementarity to the lith Session of the ASP, Nov. 14- 22,
2012, Doc. ICC-ASP/ 11 /25, ~ 3 (Oct. 16, 20 12) [hereinafter Secretariat Report to ASP 11].
66. /d., 5.
6 7. !d. ~'II 6 8. In particular with regard to the Extranei, the ICC website has fom1s that can be
utilized by either organizations with expertise or States that need assistance. According to the Report,
the "Extranei is intended to provide an infom1ation base on events relating to complementarity,
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Secretariat, the Court, and the international community. 68 The report noted
the Secretariat's work in building the Extranet and facilitating connections
between those involved in complementarity efforts. 69 The report further
commented on the Court's Legal Tools Project, which contains
international and national legal documents, cases, and other resources for
managing cases of international crimes. 70 The exit strategies of the Court
from situations in which it has been engaged were noted as a way in which
to include some type of complementarity activity. 71 The Bureau report also
described the extensive efforts of the United Nations through various
entities, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
and the U.N. Development Programme ("UNDP"), on rule of law projects
that build national capacity. 72 The report further noted the work of the
UNDP, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the focal
point countries of Denmark and South Africa in integrating
complementarity work into rule of law efforts.73 The Report of the Court
on Complementarity for the ASP meeting was similarly descriptive and
detailed both actions by the Court to assist states and a highly useful list of
thematic areas that states need to address to build capacity. 74 The report
noted advice, exchange of information, and the Legal Tools Project that
the Court has engaged in to assist States. 75 The thematic areas are a
blueprint for developing national capacity to handle international crimes.
The areas include legislation on the substantive law and procedure,
witness and victim protection and support, adequate legal representation,
outreach, victim participation and reparations, court management, training
and advice, supplies and resources, security, forensic expertise,
centralization of judicial information, and mutual judicial assistance. 76

identify the main actors and their activities, and facilitate contacts between donor States, international
and regional organizations, civil society and recipients .. .. "
68. Report of the Bureau on Complementarity to the l ith Session of the ASP, Nov. 14- 22, 201 2,
Doc. ICC-ASP/ 11 124 (Nov. 7, 201 2) [hereinafter Bureau Report to ASP I I].
69. !d. ,114.
70. /d. ,[1 8; see also ICC, Whar Are rhe ICC Legal Tools?, http ://www.lcgal-tools.org/en/whatare-the-icc-legal-tools/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (The Legal Tools "equip users with legal
infonnation, digests and an application to work more e !Tectively with core international crimes
cases").
71. Bureau Report to ASP I I, supra note 68, 1 20.
72. !d. 25. Other U.N . agencies mentioned include the Department o f Peacekeeping Operations,
the U.N . Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Women, the U.N. C hildren's Fund, and the U.N. High
Commission for Refi.1gccs.
73. /d. ,, 26.
74. Report of the Court on Complementarity to the I I th Session of the ASP, Oct. 16. 20 12. Doc.
ICC-AS P/ 11/39 [here inafter Court Report to ASP II ).
75. /d. Vl/ 9 10.
76. !d. "i 13 57.
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Within each category, there is more detailed information about what is
required to build a strong system. In other reports, efforts by the OTP to
assist national prosecutions were also described.77
Despite the plethora of activities and the strong statements encouraging
national capacity building, the ASP and the Court have also made it clear
that the ICC is not the primary actor in leading positive complementarity
efforts. For example, the Bureau's report on complementarity for the 2010
Review Conference indicated that the Court should not "become a
developmenl organization or an implementing agency." 78 Instead, they
suggested that the Court should be a "catalyst of direct State-to-State
assistance and indirect assistance through relevant international and
regional organizations and civil society.. .." 79 Similarl y, in the Bureau 's
2012 report on complementarity to the ASP, the Bureau commented:
States Parties and the Court have expressed the view that the role of
the Court itself is limited in actual capacity-building for the
investigation and prosecution of Rome Statute crimes ' in the field '.
Rather this is a matter for States, the United Nations and relevant
specialized agencies, other international and regional organizations
and civil society. The Court can in the course of implementing its
core mandate in some ways assist national jurisdictions thereby
contributing to the functioning of the Rome Statute System. The
Assembly of States Parties has an important role to play in
sustaining and furthering the efforts of the international community
in strengthening national jurisdictions through complementarity
activities, thereby enhancing the fight against impunity.80
Thus, the current position is that the ASP and the Court have a strong
interest and stake in developing national capacity, but they should be
considered facilitators or assistants rather than the primary actors for
promoting such developments.81
There are reasons for assuming a secondary role. One is a concern with
compromising the impartiality of the judicial mandate of the court,82 and a

77. For example, in the Report on the Activities of the Court to the II th Session of the ASP,
Nov. 14- 22, 201 2, Doc. ICC-AS P/1 1/2 1 (Oct. 9, 2012), there is mention of OT P interacti on with
Colombian and Guinean aulhorities on national prosecutions.
78. Bureau Report to ASP 8, supra note 4.
79. !d. ,! 42.
80. Bureau Report to ASP II , supra note 68, ~ 9.
8 1. See Heller, supra note 10, a t 106 (commenting that "the ICC has essentia lly outsourced
responsibility for upgrading national legal systems to states and NGOs").
82. See also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 9&-99 (referring to possible conflict of interest for
OTP if a state that OTP has assisted subsequently challenges admissibi lity and argues that it is
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second reason is the cost of undertaking more involved efforts .83 Despite
these concerns, the ICC would position itself better as a successful force in
international criminal justice if the institution took on a leadership role in
this area and engaged in even more systematic and institutionalized
efforts. While NGOs and governmental organizations,84 such as the
European Union, play a very significant role, the Court as an institution
should be at the center of these efforts. If part of the measure of the
success of the ICC is in not having cases, but in fostering prosecutions in
national jurisdictions, then it would benefit both the image of the ICC and
accountability in general if the ICC becomes the leading entity in
promoting national capacity. 85 The Court should also get recognition and
respect for these efforts.
One way in which the ICC as an institution could assume a leadership
role would be to create an Institute or Center that would be separate from
the Court. Such an Institute could either be a new entity created by the
ASP or could be an independent entity developed in collaboration between
the ASP and another organization. The Institute could organize and lead

satisfactorily m oving forward because ofOTP's assistance).
83. See ICTJ Stocktaking, supra note 59. at 2 (mention ing the concern of states parties regarding
cost).
84. See. e.g., Eur. Exte rnal Act ion Serv., Reply o f the European Union in response to the request
fo r in formation in paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (h) of the Plan o f Action for achieving universality and
full implementation of the Rome Sta t ute,~ 2.8 (Oct. 6, 20 11 ), available a/ http://www. icc-cpi.int/
NR/ rdonlyresi9A 7562A4-9BB5-4ACA-92F2-FEB7BFE7FE3 13/284038/ICCASPI OPOA2011 EUENG
.pdf (explaining that the EU is taking the lead on developing a "comple men tarity toolkit" as a
guidebook fo r funtre efforts toward capacity-building); OPEN SOC'Y FOUND., HANDBOOK FOR RULEOF-LAW POLICYMAKERS, DoNORS, AND IMPLEMENTERS (Nov. 20 1 1), available a/ http:l/www.opcn
socieryfoundations.org/reportslinternat ional-crimes-local-justice ("The handbook takes a step-by-step
approach to the clements required to ensure that a trial m eets international fa ir tria l standards, while
engaging the local affected commun ities in the process o f jus tice, steps rang ing from the provisio n o f
witness p ro tection capacity, to cflorts to educate local journalists and community leaders.");
Implemen tation of the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE ICC (last v isited Oct. 20, 20 13), http://www.icc
now.org/?mod=romeimplcmentatio n (describing the Coalition's efforts toward capacity-b uilding in
implementation o f the Rome Statute by sharin g d ocume nts , legal advice, and prior experiences w ith
the process); see also Review Con ference of the Rome Statute, May 3 1-June I I, 2010, Focal Poi111s ·

Compilalion of Examples of Projecls Aimed a/ Slrengllrening Domestic Jurisdictions lo Deal wilh
Rome Slatu/e Crimes for I he Review Conference of I he Rome Slatu/e (May 30, 20 I 0), avai/ahle a/
http://www. icc-cpi. int/iccdocslasp docsi RC20 I 0/ Stocktak ing/RC-ST-CM-1N F.2-ENG.pd f (describin g
efforts by multiple entities, including the ICC itself. ICTY, UN agencies, NGOs, and govern menta l
o rganizations).
85. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 73-76 (discussing proactive com plementarity as a way in
which OTP can better meet the high expectations for the ICC a nd better achieve accountability for
internationa l crimes); see also ICTJ Stockta king. supra note 59, at 3 (suggesting that coordination is
need ed by the ICC to avoid piecemeal app roaches to com plementarity); Katharine A. Marsha ll,
Prevention and Complementarity in I he lmernO/ional Criminal Courl: A Posilive Approach, 17 No. 2
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21 , 24 (2010) (s uggesting that the ICC could be a facilitator for outsid e
organizations).
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the various efforts in national capacity building. The impartiality issue for
the judges and other Court personnel could be addressed by making the
Institute separate from the operations of the ICC as a court. Additionally,
the cost could be kept at a modest level if the ASP relied on NGOs,
academics, and others to implement the training or other programs.
The Open Society Justice Initiative ("OSJl"), in its October 2012
background paper for the November ASP meeting, called for greater ASP
activity in increasing political will, education about the Court, information
exchange, and sustaining and assessing state engagement. 86 Similar to
those suggestions, I would suggest that the Institute include at least
(1) facilitation of training programs; (2) coordination of international
participation or advice in national prosecutions; and (3) publications.
Training programs for judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense
counsel , victims' counsel, interpreters, and victim and witness protection
personnel could be modeled on something like the judicial college 87 in the
United States or judicial training institutes in other parts of the world. 88
The cost can be minimized by using speakers from NGOs, academia, and,
as appropriate, from the Court personnel. Other parts of the training
programs could include sessions on legislation to implement the Rome
Statute and infrastructure advice.
A second activity, coordinating assistance or participation of
international lawyers and judges in national prosecutions, could be one of
the most innovative areas. For instance, the Institute could coordinate
providing an international judge to sit on a mixed court in a national
jurisdiction or to be an advisor for a national court. These would not be the
same judges as are appointed to the permanent Court, so a concern with
maintaining impartiality and availability would be avoided. Instead, the
Institute could maintain a list of individuals available to serve as judges or
attorneys, much as we have in an arbitration system on domestic and
international Jevels.89 The expense would be contained because the State

86. OSJI Background Paper, supra note 59, at 2- 3.
87. See A Legacy of Learning, THE NAT'L JUDICIAL COLL., http://www.judges.org/about/
history.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) ("By offering an average of 95 courses/programs annually
with more than 3,000 judges attending from all SO states, U.S. territories and more than !50 countries,
the NJC seeks to fi1rther its mission of advancing justice through judicial education.").
88. See, e.g., Judicial Education- Other Countries, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ij r/
jud_education_ other.html (last visited Oct. 20, 20 13) (describing a list of judicial training programs in
countries other than the U.S.); see also ERSUMA ( Benin), available at http://www.ohada.org/
ersuma.html (referri ng to the Ecole Regionale Superieure de Ia Magistrature, the judicial training arm
ofOHADA, the Organisation pour !'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires).
89. See, e.g., Abolll Us, PERMANENT CT. OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage
.asp?pag_id~ I027 (last visited Oct. 20, 20 13) (describing the activities of the court, including
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involved would fund the cost of having an international judge or lawyer in
its national process.
The third prong suggested is publications. The purpose is twofold.
First, the Institute would be a valuable resource if it consolidated all of the
materials that are presently being generated by NGOs, governmental
organizations, and academic institutions. Second, it would benefit the fCC
as an institution to have something tangible to document what the Court is
doing to build national capacity. Just as extensive information about
situations and cases are available on the website, there could also be
expanded categories dedicated to capacity-building activities. There arc
already beginning steps in the Complementarity forms and the Legal Tools
Project on the wcbsite.90 This recommendation is to heighten the visibility
of those steps, along with other efforts.
A feasibility and cost study would be needed, but involvement in an
Lnstitute might also be considered "cost necessary." If an objective, as
already identified by the ASP, is to help build national capacity, and this
may at some point in the future be a primary objective if there are few
cases before the Court, then it would be far better to put it in place now.
Another issue to study is whether amendments would have to be made
to the Rome Statute to create a second entity, an Institute. Certainly, the
current positive complementarity activities arc occurring under the present
statute. This even includes some of the activities of the Secretariat of the
ASP. 91 The objective of assisting with national capacity building is found
within the concept of complementarity embedded in the statute.92

assistance in the selection of arbitmtors and ability to function as appointing authority as needed in the
resolution of international disputes); ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute·resolution·services/icc-inlernation
al-court-of-arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 16, 20 13) (explaining that, due to its global network, the court
can appoint an arbitmtor with the necessary expertise for any type of business dispute); Arbitrators
and Mediators, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, http://www.adr.org (last visi ted Oct. 20, 2013) (follow
"Arbi trators and Mediators" hyperlink) {noting that the organization maintains a roster of arbitrators
with various qualifications and areas of expertise); see also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 96
{suggesting a similar idea for OTP that they should keep a list of experts).
90. Complementarity, ICC, http://icc-cpi.int/en mcnus/asp/complcmentarity/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013); What are the ICC Legal Tools?, LEGAL·TOOLS.ORG, http://www.legaltools.org/en/what·are-the-icc·legal·tools/ {last visited Feb. 23, 2103) {Legal Tools project).
91. The Secretariat reports to the ASP and is administratively located within the Registry. See
Establishment of the Pennanent Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties to the International
Criminal Court, Doc. ICC-ASP/ 2/ ResJ (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_
docs/Publications/Compendium/Compcndium.3rd.21.ENG.pdf
92. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at 3, 12; see also Burke-White, supra note 4, at 76- 82
(discussing the provisions of the Rome Statute that govern the intemction between OTP and states, and
commenting on the purpose and consistency of those provisions with proactive complementarity).
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Moreover, the idea of assistance to States, such as in Article 93 (I 0),93 also
conveys an underlying intent to work with national jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, more specific provisions might be needed unless the
Institute was considered part of one of the present organs of the Court or
was established by the ASP in collaboration with an outside organization.
CONCLUSION

The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC has identified and
emphasized an objective of positive complementarity, or building national
capacity to adjudicate the Rome Statute crimes. There is tremendous
opportunity for positive complementarity to become one of the most
important achievements of the ICC as an institution. With
complementarity as an underlying principle of the Court, a measure of the
success of the ICC will be in the development of national capacity to
prosecute serious international crimes. It is often stated that the ICC would
be a success if it had no cases to try because national jurisdictions were
94
assuming the responsibility to prosecute. This type of success, however,
is dependent upon building national capacity and in redefining the purpose
of the ICC as an institution.
Complementarity is likely to prove to be a strength of the ICC. Despite
potential weaknesses in positioning the ICC as secondary to national
prosecutions, the ICC could make positive complementarity its flagship in
the future. This would adjust the emphasis on the judicial function and the
number of cases tried to include building national capacity as an equal
partner in defining the success or achievements of the Court. In order to
make this adjustment, both the ICC as an institution and the international
community need to focus on this reconfiguration.
The reconfiguration of the ICC to encompass a focus on positive
complementarity is already ongoing, but it is not receiving sufficient
recognition. The ASP through the Secretariat and the organs of the Court
are assisting national capacity building through information sharing,
training, and coordination with outside organizations. The ICC, however,
is deliberately not taking on a leadership role in these activities. Although
there are understandable concerns of maintaining impartiality of the

93. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Time is of the Essence: 11w In-Depth Analysis Chart in
Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court, 48 No.4 CR IM. L. BULL. ART. I, II (2012)
(suggesting that art. 93(10) is the authority for positive complementarity as it provides that the ICC
may cooperate and assist slates with investigations and trials).
94. See, e.g., supra note 55.
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judicial function and the cost of more activities, the ICC as an institution
could greatly benefit from increasing its visibility in the area of national
capacity building. Especially if a measure of the importance of the Court is
in its assistance in increasing national ability to prosecute international
crimes, it would be to the ICC's advantage to take a leading role and to
emphasize its activities on its website and other publications.
One way in which the ICC could establish a greater role in positive
complementarity is through the creation of an Institute or Center dedicated
to its work on national capacity building. The Institute should be
independent of the judicial function to avoid any conflict of interest or
impingement on the impartiality of the Court. The cost of such an Institute
could be contained by utilizing the vast array of outside organizations that
are already engaged in capacity building work. The Institute would be
valuable in coordinating the efforts, disseminating information, and
providing leadership.
Complementarity presently is both an advantage and a challenge for the
ICC. A consequence of complementarity is that, now and in the future, the
ICC will be significant both for the trials it conducts and for its impact on
national capacity to try international crimes. Increasing the emphasis on
building national capacity as an objective and achievement of the ICC as
an institution is likely to help ensure that complementarity is a strength in
the future.

